

# **The Joint Programme for Peace (JPP): Harmonized Support for Sustaining Peace in Sri Lanka**



UN RESIDENT COORDINATOR'S OFFICE

## Table of Contents

---

<b>SUMMARY</b> .....	2
<b>RATIONALE AND THEORY OF CHANGE</b> .....	3
Theory of Change .....	6
<b>DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION</b> .....	7
<b>OUTPUTS</b> .....	7
<i>Output 1 (Dealing with the Past):</i> .....	7
<i>Output 2 (Social Cohesion):</i> .....	9
<i>Output 3 (Durable Returns/Resettlement and Economic reintegration):</i> .....	10
<b>MAIN BENEFICIARY AND STAKEHOLDERS</b> .....	11
<b>CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES</b> .....	12
<b>GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS</b> .....	13
<b>SECRETARIAT</b> .....	17
<b>RESULTS, MONITORING and EVALUATION</b> .....	19
<b>FUND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS</b> .....	20
<b>CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS</b> .....	21
<b>FUNDING ALLOCATIONS</b> .....	21
<b>ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCES</b> .....	22
Terms of Reference for the JPP Technical Committee .....	22
Terms of Reference for a Secretariat as Convenor of the JPP .....	22
Terms of Reference for the Technical Committee members of the JPP Outputs.....	22
Terms of Reference for UNDP MPTF Office (As AA) .....	22
<b>ANNEX B: REPORTING SCHEDULE</b> .....	23

## SUMMARY

---

The United Nations (UN) established a Joint Programme for Peace (JPP) to ensure harmonized and sustainable support towards securing a durable peace that would supplement the process of economic development embarked upon by the government. The JPP was operationalised in 2019 as a 'bridging instrument' that would build on the peacebuilding agenda advanced under the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP), supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), that was in place between 2016 and 2020. The PPP concluded in September 2020. The JPP seeks to build upon past results and continue the process of strengthening justice processes for victims of war (dealing with the past), advancing social cohesion, promoting return and resettlement of conflict displaced persons.

Resources will be strategically aligned under three pillars, to advance (1) the process of dealing with the past, (2) social cohesion, and (3) durable returns/resettlement and economic development.

Considering the fluidity in operational contexts faced by the JPP, the following document is intended to be an indicative design document; it is not a prescriptive design document.

**DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS:** A total of USD 7.9m: Australia (USD 1.3m), UK (USD 4.2m), Canada (USD 1.3m) and USA (USD 1.16m), with the invitation to other development partners to contribute.

**DURATION:** Three years initially, with the intention of extending in line with national priorities and longer-term resource mobilization.

**START DATE:** 2 April 2019

**END DATE:** 31 March 2022

**JPP Outcome:** Multiple partners at all levels of society promote justice, foster social cohesion, and prioritize sustainable and secure integration of conflict displaced persons for achieving durable peace in Sri Lanka.

**Output 1 (Dealing with the Past):** Credible, victim-centric processes in compliance with international standards and obligations support victims' access to justice and their rights to truth and reparations. Reforms to prevent recurrence of human rights violations are implemented.

**Output 2 (Social Cohesion):** Communal relations and social cohesion strengthened by addressing drivers of violence, promoting youth empowerment, and gender equality, ensuring safeguards on climate-conflict issues, promoting inclusive governance, protecting women and girls, and fostering respect for human rights..

**Output 3 (Durable Returns/Resettlement and Economic reintegration):** Return, resettlement and/or local integration of conflict-displaced persons in the Northern and Eastern Provinces supported in a sustainable, safe and dignified manner, based on mutual trust and a common goal of rebuilding lives and communities.

**The Joint Programme for Peace (JPP)**, operationalized in 2019, the JPP was originally envisioned as a 'bridging instrument' to build on the peacebuilding agenda advanced under the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP). The JPP aimed to support the Government's aspirations to achieve its targets under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,<sup>1</sup> especially in relation to SDG 16. It also supports the Government in efforts to maintain, strengthen and build on peace in the country.

Since the JPP inception in April 2019, three critical events have fundamentally altered Sri Lanka's peacebuilding landscape. First, the Easter Sunday bombings in April 2019 which fueled and compounded ethno-religious tensions; second, the presidential and parliamentary elections and the subsequent political transition (2019-2020), which has posed challenges to consistent programming; third, Sri Lanka's announcement (February 2020) of withdrawal from co-sponsorship of UNHRC Resolution 30/1 and 40/1.<sup>2</sup>

Prior to these three events, the JPP focused on strengthening redress mechanisms for victims of conflict, as well as on promoting returns/resettlement of conflict-displaced persons. In the evolving context, there is a need for strengthening social cohesion, engaging government, CSOs and communities at all levels to create infrastructures for peace that promote dialogue, mutual understanding, and peaceful co-existence. Notable efforts towards building cohesive society include, but are not limited to, strengthening of institutions to implement the Official Languages Policy, addressing drivers of inter-communal tensions such as hate speech and other forms of extremism that contribute to the incitement of violence, promoting adolescent and youth participation in governance platforms and equitable access to social services at the local level.

**Rationale for dealing with the past:** The number of missing or disappeared persons in Sri Lanka ranks among the highest in the world, estimated at a minimum of 9,000 persons by the Office of Missing Persons, as published in December 2020. The armed conflict in 2009 was characterized by the recruitment of child soldiers, allegations of torture, political repression, and sexual and gender-based violence, according to the 2014 United Nations investigation into Sri Lanka.

In 2011, the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recommended that disappearances and abductions of persons be investigated, and accountability and responsibility on missing persons be ensured. The Presidential Commission headed by Mr. Maxwell Paranagama was tasked to investigate into the cases of Missing Persons in Sri Lanka and to ascertain the facts and whereabouts of missing persons. The Presidential Commission received 23,586 complaints that included approximately 5,000 complaints from families of security force personnel.

Over period 2015-2016, the Sri Lankan government received advice and technical expertise of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to design the OMP; the UN also supported its operationalization, through support for the implementation of the PPP. In 2016, the Presidential Commission was disbanded, and the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) was established under the OMP Act No. 14 of 2016, to look into the fate of the missing family members. Three regional centres for the OMP were also established. An interim report of OMP activities was released with challenges encountered; this also outlined state responsibilities in ensuring victim justice and reparations. The OMP has recorded over 23,000 cases of the missing; over 630 certificates of absence were issued to victims' families, entitling them for government compensation. In January 2020, the current government announced that it will review the OMP Act; in February 2020, the Government of Sri Lanka affirmed at the UN the responsibility of the state to pursue truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, the OMP began issuing interim reports to victims' families to expedite the issuing of Certificates of Absence (COAs); listing of missing persons at district level was also initiated.

**Rationale for Social Cohesion:** The 2019 Easter Sunday attacks exacerbated ethno-religious tensions between Sinhalese and Muslims. Simmering low-intensity tensions have culminated in recurring rounds of acute violence in mid-sized towns, where Muslims have been targeted. This occurred, for instance, in 2014 (Aluthgama), 2017 (Gintota), 2018 (Ampara and Digana), and in 2019, a few weeks after the Easter attacks (North Western Province and Gampaha District). The government has pledged to establish an Inter-Religious Advisory Council under the chairmanship of the President to address inter-faith dynamics related to social cohesion.<sup>4</sup>

Myths and misconceptions around family planning have played a crucial role in fueling hate speech and ethnic tensions, pointing to the effects of widespread disinformation and hate speech campaigns pervading social media.<sup>5</sup> Such effects are evinced by several incidents targeting the Muslim community, including the Digana riots, the online response towards Muslims following the Easter attacks, Muslim women becoming a target sub-group, and stigmatization of Muslims during the COVID-19 pandemic. Social media campaigns reach millions of Sri Lankans, mainly between the ages of 18-40. Noting similar trends elsewhere in the world, the UN has issued global guidance on hate speech, specifically in the context of COVID-19. If left unaddressed, hate speech on social media may catalytically contribute to chronic social tensions that generate future cycles of violence.

The phase of targeted physical violence against the Muslim community was preceded by a phase where Sinhalese nationalist groups led a campaign to boycott Muslim business establishments; incidents of targeted attacks against select Muslim businesses followed. Much of the boycott campaign, and hate speech targeting the Muslim community in general, has occurred in the social media domain. This has contributed to the delegitimization of Muslims in the minds of many Sinhalese, especially Sinhalese Buddhists, evinced by increased Islamophobic hate speech on social media, and more accommodation of it by audiences. This elevates threat perception and facilitates soft conditions that eventually accommodate harder types of attacks on the Muslim community; this is borne out by the cycles of violence that followed. Meanwhile, social media has also been used by radical Islamists to further agendas of hate against particular communities, as demonstrated by suspected lead Easter bomber Zaharan Hashim,<sup>6</sup> further underscoring the need for hate speech monitoring on social media.

Between March 2020 to 16 November 2020, Sri Lanka has recorded 816 dangerous speech incidents, which includes hate speech, disinformation, and harassment on Facebook. Of these recorded incidents, 58% of them carried some form of hate speech, whether directed at ethnic, religious, or gender identity, or another identity category. Between August-October 2020, incidents of dangerous speech online increased by 27.5%.<sup>7</sup> Thus, it is important to note the pivotal role of hate speech in legitimizing and mobilizing violence in cultural, structural, and direct (physical) forms.<sup>8</sup> This makes tackling online and offline hate speech a key priority in the JPP's social cohesion strategy. The interlinked nature of hate speech both online and offline with legitimizing and mobilizing violence is not unique to Sri Lanka. It has been identified across the region, from Pakistan to Myanmar, consistent with the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech<sup>9</sup>.

With the end of the civil war and a renewed effort at a lasting peace, the Government supports the view that education can play a prominent role in building inter-ethnic and inter-religious trust and understanding. Importantly, education can also convey to the younger generation attitudes of peace and tolerance, and values that help build a sense of national solidarity. However, to do this, formal education must be complemented through measures outside the system. This can be done

by strengthening capacities of children, adolescent and youth networks/organisations to promote social cohesion and foster an inclusive national identity, while ensuring the equitable delivery of social services.

Another area that could have a negative bearing on social cohesion is climate change.. Climate change acts as threat multiplier of conflicts,<sup>10</sup> it exacerbates existing tensions on land, water, and access to resources which become more scarcity due to climate change. Climate change could compound existing variance in human security among ethnic groups<sup>11</sup> in the north and east; threats to communities deemed already vulnerable could be amplified. Disaster situations could worsen existing inequalities, not least given politicized resource allocation. This increases volatility and elevates conflict risks. Prevention or mitigation necessitates support for multi-level institutional development, a conflict-sensitivity filter that ensures climate responses to not worsen existing tensions or cause new ones, and an enriched understanding of the nexus between climate change and conflict.

Sri Lanka's emergence as an international narcotics transshipment route presents further threats to social cohesion; it elevates risks of local criminal involvement, and leakage into the local populace; resulting societal impacts could arise from increased criminality and drug use, especially among youth. Drugs coming into the country, and shipped via it include heroin from Afghanistan and India, and increasingly, methamphetamine originating mainly from Myanmar. Drug seizures have increased since the end of the war in 2009, indicating possible increases in flows both into and via the country<sup>12</sup>. Approximately 45,000 people are estimated to be regular heroin users. A cheaper tablet form of methamphetamine (*yaba*) has possibly taken over or will likely soon take over from heroin as the main drug used in the country, and smuggled through it<sup>13</sup>. However, narcotics trafficking rings through Sri Lanka are not led by local organized crime groups; this is done by regional and transnational groups,<sup>14</sup> although the possibility of increased local criminal involvement in distribution within the country presents its own risks. Nevertheless, there is still insufficient understanding on the impacts of these new forms of organized crime to effectively estimate the risks to stability and conflict in Sri Lanka. .

An increase in large-scale construction projects and rapid expansion of real estate markets post-war, with a regular and poorly tracked flow of money from abroad could elevate risks of money-laundering, corruption and financial crime, if unchecked. This could exacerbate existing issues around disparate resource allocation, and undermine governance, law and order, straining societal relations. The country has laws pertaining to financial crimes; but its enforcement capacity is very limited<sup>15</sup>.

Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) presents another cause and consequence of social inequalities<sup>16</sup>. These exist throughout the country but have been especially pronounced in former war-torn areas. A combination of risks at the individual, family (relationships), community and societal levels sustain and promote VAWG. These include genetic predisposition; socialization process; relationships and household dynamics; and macro-level factors such as religious ideologies, gender regimes, and market forces that affect the mental and physical health of women and girls, violates their human rights, and has negative impacts on peace, stability and social cohesion.

The role of local governments to address the drivers of conflict and promote social cohesion through improved and equitable citizen-centric services is critical. This will necessitate the local governments to roll out platforms that proactively engage communities in prioritizing development interventions and promoting inclusive modals for implementation.

**Rationale for durable returns/resettlement and economic reintegration:** Since 2009, 61,287 acres of land has been released from the military in the Northern Province. 21,684 acres was released

between 2009-2015 and 39,604 acres between 2015-2018. As of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2018, the latest date for which data is available, 11,430 acres remained under military use. This is equivalent to 90 percent of private land and 79 percent of state land having been released.

In terms of resettlement, 571,974 people (167,087 families) have resettled in the Northern Province. 561,910 people (164,836 families) were resettled between 2009-2015 and 10,064 people (2,251 families) between 2015–2018.

It is estimated that 34,916 people (10,138 families) remain internally displaced, awaiting support for returns/resettlement or a durable solution. Between 2012 and 2018 numbers for those returned/resettled were 7,275 individuals (2,992 families). It is estimated that a caseload of nearly 100,000 remains outside of Sri Lanka, with the large majority in Tamil Nadu<sup>17</sup>.

In his election manifesto, subsequently tabled in Parliament and adopted as Government Policy, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa pledged to return all private land currently held by the government to their respective owners. The government has also pledged to issue permit land to farmers,<sup>18</sup> and housing for war-affected families.<sup>19</sup> The government's national-level prioritization of agriculture and fisheries as strategic sectors for economic expansion and food security<sup>20</sup> are particularly noteworthy in this respect, given that the majority of inhabitants of the north and east are engaged in these livelihoods. In addition, the government has underlined preference for local recruitment in filling local-area vacancies in government jobs, the latter with specific reference to the north and east.<sup>21</sup> This includes prioritization of Tamil-language speakers when recruiting to the police, a key institution in the justice sector, in these areas.<sup>22</sup> If acted upon expeditiously and in full, these pledges by the government could help contribute to durable solutions on returns/resettlement that extend substantially beyond narrowly focused emphasis on places of dwelling<sup>23</sup>, contribute to restoring confidence in a holistic process of post-war transformation, thereby helping foster lasting peace.

While recognizing the efforts underway by the Government to address the needs of internally displaced persons and refugee to return and start rebuilding their lives, the High Commissioner for Human Rights in her February 2019 report to the Human Rights Council (OHCHR, 08/02/2019) underlined concerns about the process noting that some restitutions have been only partial or incomplete, allowing for access to dwellings but not to livelihood resources (such as agricultural land or fishing resources) or vice versa. On other occasions, public services, such as schools, remain unavailable. This builds on the earlier analyses by Brookings Institution report on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons that highlights how resolving internal displacement and preventing future displacement is inextricably linked to achieving lasting peace. The report underlines that unresolved problems of displacement serve as drivers for instability threatening peacebuilding efforts; it also highlights how durable solutions, particularly returns, cannot be achieved for internally displaced persons without human security, security of property, and securing conditions for sustainable solutions.<sup>24</sup>

## **Theory of Change**

The Joint Programme for Peace overall goal (outcome) *is that multiple partners at all levels of society promote justice, foster social cohesion, and prioritize sustainable and secure integration of conflict displaced persons for achieving durable peace in Sri Lanka.*

The JPPs theory of change therefore is:

*IF the UN collaborates to assist the Government of Sri Lanka in strengthening mechanisms for victim-centric justice and respect for human rights;*

*IF drivers of communal tensions are addressed through more equitable rights-based service delivery and by building capacities of systems/individuals to promote peace, security, and non-violence, including gender-based violence; and  
IF conflict displaced persons can return/resettle in a safe and dignified manner with access to basic infrastructure and sustainable livelihoods,*

*THEN the country can move towards its goal of sustained and durable peace in line with SDG 16. This strategy is needed BECAUSE Sri Lanka has experienced critical events that have fundamentally altered its peacebuilding landscape. Concerted efforts are needed to sustain peace in what is a diminishing space afforded by the end of the civil war, and ensure that Sri Lanka continues to maintain a positive development trajectory.*

## **DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION**

---

To contribute to the goal and the JPP's theory of change, the following three output areas have been developed, taking account of the dynamic operating context, and possibility for change. The iterative design approach will accommodate future adjustments, as necessary.

## **OUTPUTS**

---

***Output 1 (Dealing with the Past):*** *Credible, victim-centric processes in compliance with international standards and obligations support victims' access to justice and their rights to truth and reparations. Reforms to prevent recurrence of human rights violations are implemented.*

Support under this output builds upon past investments in identifying the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared, further truth seeking, providing for reparations and justice to victims consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).<sup>25</sup> Interventions will support the commitment of the President to significantly improve compensation to families affected by war,<sup>26</sup> as well as with Sri Lanka's statement to the UN in New York on 13 February 2020, which reiterates the application of principles on state obligations to pursue truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence.<sup>27</sup>

### **Key Activities for output 1:**

- Technically support, in close coordination with national stakeholders and the ICRC, the OMP in developing a comprehensive strategic plan and prioritizing key activities for the year to fast-track delivery on its core mandate to track missing persons.
- Provide technical experts for mechanisms that deal with the past.
- Support regional offices to fast-track outreach to victims.
- Support archiving materials from past commissions.
- Technically assist in the development of a comprehensive draft and costed national policy on reparations that considers the specific needs of women and children, and psychosocial support for victims. The draft policy will also provide a framework for the costing and provision of reparations.
- Technically assist state agencies implementing reparations processes.
- Protect and support CSOs and human rights defenders (HRDs), consistent with the principles of inclusivity and rejection of intolerance.
- Provide mental health and psychosocial-related services to conflict-affected communities, considering the impact of COVID-19, in the north and east.
- Undertake high-level advocacy aimed at sustaining momentum and focus. The UN will continue to use the Heads of Missions briefing for such engagement, whilst also continuing to liaise



closely with high-level visits from OHCHR, DPPA and bilateral partners to reinforce points and promote consistent messaging.

***Output 2 (Social Cohesion): Communal relations and social cohesion strengthened by addressing drivers of violence, promoting gender equality and youth empowerment protecting women and girls, building safeguards on climate-conflict issues, inclusive governance, and ensuring respect for human rights.***

In the context of ethnically and religiously pluralist Sri Lanka, social cohesion best fostered through building respect and pride in diversity and co-existence, and promoting mutual understanding, rather than permit conditions for some identity groups to feel threatened by others. Therefore, the UN will address horizontal cohesion (focusing on relationships within and between groups, including religious and political figures at national and local levels), vertical cohesion (to improve citizen-state relations and trust) and individual capacities (enhancing people's ability to deal with impacts of violent conflict and contribute to peace).

This output will also build on existing capacity to monitor hate speech, for example leveraging institutional partnerships with social media companies (e.g. Facebook) for timely reporting of harmful content. This output will also use big data analytics tools and invest in a tailored approach that supports improving 'digital literacy and identifying disinformation', using behavioral change communications approaches.

Ensuring that interventions and initiatives that promote peace, social cohesion are well rooted at the local level is also important. Working with community-based organizations (CBOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) at a local level will be important to enhance reconciliation and coexistence within and between communities. In addition, engaging the private sector offers opportunities to mainstream human rights and advance cohesion.

Key interventions under this output include:

- Building capacity of children, adolescent and youth networks/organisations to promote social cohesion through youth leadership and participation<sup>28</sup> and engage them in addressing drivers of communal tensions, including violence against women and girls;
- Monitoring online hate speech, develop early warning measures and mapping of conflict indicators inclusive of an assessment of conditions for civil society towards developing an ongoing barometer on conditions faced by civil society;
- Developing alternate positive narratives, including with support of religious leaders and faith-based organisations and generate positive narratives on social cohesion through media;
- Engaging in increasing understanding on conflict-climate nexus including conducting research to guide peacebuilding programming;
- Empowering adolescents and youth through life skills programmes to equip them with the knowledge and skills to remain safe and prevent violence, including gender-based violence;
- Providing technical assistance to local governments to ensure equitable delivery of social services, (health, water, sanitation and hygiene, protection), to support equitable distribution of resources;
- Understanding the impact of transnational and other forms of organized crime inclusive of trafficking in narcotics and persons.
- Assisting local governments to roll out innovative platforms for citizen engagement in local development planning, implementation and monitoring;
- Engaging parents to promote positive gender norms and avoid gender stereotypes so as to ensure girls and boys have equal rights and responsibilities within the household;
- Conducting a value chain analysis in identified sectors to understand market opportunities, and to examine the dynamics of social norm change in relation to changes in the economic status of women;
- Providing skills training (product development, use of technology) and capacity-building on business management skills (business planning, marketing, financial literacy and management

- particularly information on accessing loans and linking with credible lending institutions) for women in identified sectors;

**Output 3 (Durable Returns/Resettlement and Economic reintegration):** *Return, resettlement and/or local integration of conflict-displaced persons in the Northern and Eastern Provinces supported in a sustainable, safe and dignified manner, based on mutual trust and a common goal of rebuilding lives and communities*

While progress has been made on returns/resettlement of those displaced by years of conflict, the JPP recognizes the importance of completing this process in a durable manner that supports people-centric economic development. Therefore, the approach under this output is to strengthen engagement with government to secure state resources to ensure that IDP and refugee returnee households can return to their original places of habitation or resettle in the Northern and Eastern Provinces after having been displaced by the conflict, in a dignified and sustainable manner with access to essential services and livelihoods. Emphasis on ‘returns’ will be prioritized over ‘resettlement’ in all instances.<sup>29</sup> This includes building on the President’s pledge to return all private land currently held by the government to their respective owners<sup>30</sup>/allocation of land and the provision of basic infrastructure, healthcare<sup>31</sup>, issuing permit land to farmers,<sup>32</sup> and housing for war-affected families<sup>33</sup>. Support for durable returns/resettlement also extend to the provision of both hard and soft infrastructure that would support sustainable livelihoods,<sup>34</sup> as well as the provision of healthcare<sup>35</sup> in line with the government’s policy commitments. The output will leverage the government’s national-level prioritization of agriculture and fisheries as strategic sectors for economic expansion and food security<sup>36</sup>, given that the majority of inhabitants of the North and East are engaged in these livelihoods.

The output is guided by lessons and experiences of earlier assistance to target communities under two broad groups: (1) those returning to land recently released by the Government, and (2) those communities previously returned/resettled, where a large proportion of households struggle to secure economic self-sufficiency. Communities returning to seven ‘newly released’ zones in the Northern Province will be the key beneficiaries. In addition, the output would consider risks posed by climate change into its interventions to better assure durable and resilient solutions for resettlement.

There is wide interest by development partners and a variety of actors engaged in this area of work, including within the UN structure. This interest should be leveraged to organize and harmonize such activities to best effect; this includes agendas for joint implementation, and partnerships.

Key interventions, broadly bifurcated under two strands of resettlement activities – ‘basic infrastructure,’ and ‘sustainable livelihoods’ - include:

- Supporting the operationalization of the durable solutions policy;
- Extending holistic support to improve the outreach and efficiency of service delivery via local-level government structures,<sup>37</sup> including, but not limited to, local needs assessment; development of local-level plans in partnership with other stakeholders with an emphasis on outreach to newly returned/resettled communities; and institutional strengthening to enhance public sector service provisioning relating to livelihood support, social services, and resettlement processes.
- Facilitating Government partners to conduct mobile clinics for the provision of basic documentation (i.e. national identity cards and birth/death/marriage certificates) and legal assistance.

- Empowering and strengthen local capabilities, including those of local government institutions, civil society organizations, including community-based organizations, and cooperatives to improve the reach and efficiency of service delivery.
- Strengthening community resilience to droughts and floods that frequently affect the Provinces, including adopting fast and effective interventions for livelihood support that, whilst being informed by expert-led research and in-depth contextual understanding, are also timely and help households to remain at their site of return without going into debt.
- Continuing dialogue with government to encourage land releases in accordance with government policy, as stated in the President’s manifesto and Statement of Government Policy<sup>38</sup>.
- Conducting community-based rapid assessments on immediate social, environmental, economic and governance needs, with a special focus on the needs and protection concerns of women, youth, elderly, disabled and ex-combatants.
- Extending home garden and family livestock-related assistance to ensure a basic level of subsistence and nutrition.
- Supporting the renovation and construction of high priority social infrastructure (i.e. agro-wells, landing sites, rain water harvesting systems, roads, sanitation facilities etc), through modalities aimed at capacitating the local community and injecting much needed income (i.e. CBO implementation and cash-for-work).
- Identifying innovative income generation options, informed by market and value chain analyses, and tailored to the needs of vulnerable categories such as youth, women, refugee returnees, ex-combatants, elderly, disabled.
- Providing technical advice and inputs to support the scaling up or diversification of livelihoods, including helping cooperatives, producer groups and households reduce vulnerability to climatic shocks.
- Identifying options to scale up post-harvest value addition, means to mechanize the process and facilitate private sector investments to ensure sustainability.

## MAIN BENEFICIARY AND STAKEHOLDERS

---

The main beneficiaries are the people affected by the conflict and the State. However, ultimately, the whole of Sri Lankan society should benefit through a well-coordinated approach that prioritises dealing with the past and durable solutions on returns/resettlement and economic development in a manner that supports non-recurrence, and thereby helps secure a sustainable peace.

People affected by the conflict or other cycles of violence will benefit most directly through access to the mechanisms on dealing with the past; those displaced by the conflict will benefit through support for durable solutions. Families of the disappeared, survivors of Sexual and Gender Based Violence and victims of torture are examples of the categories of people that may wish to access the mechanism established to deal with the past. Considering the expressed commitment of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to achieve the SDGs,<sup>39</sup> the JPP will strengthen Sri Lanka’s efforts to move forward in achieving a sustainable peace in relation to SDG Goal 16.

Civil society will benefit through multiple stakeholder consultations to protect gains and preserve key elements of prevention-based programming; it will also benefit from needs-based training, including on entrepreneurship/self-employment.

Other key interlocutors include a wide range of government entities who will be supported to move forward on their mandates, either through the provision of technical assistance or direct UN interventions on the ground.

## CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

---

The JPP will be managed to ensure issues of gender, conflict-sensitivity and human rights are mainstreamed throughout all operations.

**Gender:** Initiatives supported through the JPP will guarantee a gender lens, for example prioritizing women's access to, and participation in mechanisms for dealing with the past, and returns/resettlement processes, as well as acknowledging and responding to the specific grievances they have suffered and their specific needs for redress and protection. The Secretary-General's report on Women, Peace and Security in 2015 (S/2015/716) highlights that "the inclusion of women leads to more sustainable peace and enhanced prevention efforts." The Secretary-General's Guidance Note on reparations for conflict-related sexual violence recognizes the need for approaches to reparation that are specifically tailored to the consequences, sensitivity and stigmas attached to these harms in societies globally, and to the specific needs of sexual and gender-based violence survivors. The peacebuilding survey will also allow for gender disaggregated data, and the report includes a gender analysis of the results.

**Conflict-Sensitivity:** A do-no-harm lens will be applied across the programming cycle. The design of programme interventions will be guided by up-to-date information on context, in particular conflict dynamics and peacebuilding perceptions. Selection of beneficiaries, geographical areas and implementing partners will be transparent, informed by relevant data and the guidance of key stakeholders. The JPP will integrate consultation with stakeholders, especially civil society (beneficiaries, victim groups etc), at multiple stages in the programming cycle to help mitigate against the risk that chosen approaches have unintentional negative consequences, for example creation/exacerbation of tensions. The JPP will also integrate feedback mechanisms into its interventions, providing space for stakeholders to highlight potential risks or to advise on overall perceptions or concerns. Lastly, sustainability of services and processes will be promoted through an emphasis on national ownership and adoption of clear exit strategies, with a view to ensuring that raised expectations do not go unmet.

**Human Rights:** Interventions supported through the JPP must be guided by international human rights standards and best practices in the field of dealing with the past. In particular, the Secretary-General's report on "The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies" (August 2004, S/2004/616); the Secretary-General's report "Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law" (December 2006, A/61/636-S/2006/980 ); the Secretary-General's "Guidance Note on the United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice" (March 2010); the Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through actions to combat impunity (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1); the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 2005); the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on "Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the right to the truth"; and the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the General Assembly on "Analytical study on human rights and transitional justice" (August 2009, A/HRC/12/18), the "report of the Representative of the Secretary General on the human rights of internally displaced persons" (11 August 2010, A/65/282), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement" (11 February 1998, submitted pursuant to the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/39, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2), as well as relevant jurisprudence from treaty bodies and international tribunals. In addition, the fund will ensure that proper consideration is given to mainstream general protection and promotion of human rights and that supported interventions are rights-based and victim-centric.

**Climate Change:** The nexus between climate change and conflict risks arises from a scarcity of resources exacerbated by climate change and increasing competition for diminishing resources; this includes land, water, and access to food, livestock, and livelihoods. Thus, the impact of climate change could elevate challenges to social cohesion. Unsustainable development practices, including in activities that may support returns/resettlement, could exacerbate such risks. Therefore, a strengthened understanding of climate change risks, and their impact on specific interventions, as well as overall dynamics of peace and conflict, is needed.

## **GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS**

---


The coordination of the JPP was supported in part by the presence of a Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat, housed at the UN Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO). The JPP during its first year benefitted from low coordination costs due to synergies with the UN-PBF portfolio which provided coordination support through its secretariat function and generated knowledge products and analyses which benefitted the functioning of the JPP. However, the PBF Secretariat concluded operations in September 2020.

In 2021, the RCO will roll out the UN Sri Lanka SDG multi-partner pooled (UNSLSDG) fund instrument that will focus on three areas/windows:


- **Peace:** Bridging the peace and development gap;
- **Resilience:** Building resilience to address inequalities by tackling climate change and disaster risk reduction;
- **Data & Planning:** Strengthening capacities for national planning and financing strategies, statistical and data development and innovations in the use of technology to improve government functions;

Funding for this JPP will be channeled to the (above) peace window of the fund and therefore the SDG Fund will provide the overarching architecture for operational and governance of this JPP. In practical terms, this means that the SDG Fund Secretariat will also support the requirements of this JPP (as it is under the Peace window). This streamlined approach enables development partners (DPs) to support a range of interventions both within the JPP or, if desired, in the other two pillars (resilience and national planning) of the SDG Fund.

As the JPP will be nested within the SDG Fund, it will benefit from the governing arrangements of the Fund.



As the JPP is situated under the peace pillar of the SDG Fund it will be steered by the Fund Steering Committee (see below). In addition, the Thematic Window Operational Committees (TWOC) are governance bodies set up at Window level of the SDG Fund and has delegated authority for operational decisions on the activities of the Fund, within the Fund Thematic Windows, in line with the strategic guidance of the Fund Steering Committee. In addition, the JPP will have two technical committees to facilitate coordination.



The **Fund Steering Committee** will be the body charged with strategic guidance and general supervision of the JPP, and is expected to meet at least annually and more frequently as required.

It will be co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator, and comprised of the heads of partner UN agencies, development partners, and the UNDP Multi-Party Trust Fund Office (MPTFO), which will act as Administrative Agent (AA).

The role of the **Fund Steering Committee** will be to:

- a. Provide general oversight and exercising overall accountability of the Fund.
- b. Provide policy and strategic guidance by regularly setting, validating and adjusting the Fund's strategic guidelines: in order to do so the Steering Committee shall commission outline notes for the Secretariat as often as necessary. These notes must present a succinct overview of implementation of the Workplan, draw lessons from the experiences of implementation, and propose reorientation when necessary. Where successive Workplans are implemented, mid-term external evaluations shall be commissioned through the Secretariat. These external evaluations must include precise strategic recommendations for the Steering Committee.
- c. Approve the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Fund, including the Fund results framework, as well as its revision when deemed necessary: The Steering Committee will review and validate the TOR of the Fund. Any revision of the TOR shall be of a substantive nature and shall only be carried out on the basis of a decision of the Steering Committee. The Secretariat will be responsible for carrying out the review, in consultation with the relevant stakeholders, which will then be submitted to the Steering Committee for validation.
- d. Approve projects to be financed by the Fund. The Steering Committee will analyze the programmatic and financial aspects of project proposals based on the recommendations submitted by the Secretariat and will approve or reject the proposals.
- e. Approve allocations. Depending on the available resources, the Steering Committee will allocate funds to approved projects according to the Fund priorities, expected results and allocation criteria.
- f. Monitor and Review the status and implementation of the Fund and oversee progress against the results framework.
- g. Regularly review the Fund risk monitoring matrix updated by the Secretariat.
- h. Review and approve the periodic progress reports and the final report consolidated by the Secretariat based on the reports submitted by the Participating UN Organizations.
- i. Commission independent evaluations for the different windows of the fund.
- j. Approve the Fund communication strategy developed by the Secretariat.

The Steering Committee will meet at least annually and more frequently as required and make decision by consensus.

The Steering Committee is chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator. It consists of representatives from all the United Nations agencies signatories of the MOU and all the donors contributing to the Fund.



All the member's categories (UN Agencies and donors) should be represented in the meeting. In addition, exceptional participants may be invited to attend when any matter requires clarification or external opinion. Such participants will not be involved in decision making.

The Fund Secretariat and MPTFO participates in the SC meetings as ex-officio members.

#### Avoidance of Conflict of Interest

All members of the Steering Committee shall declare any conflict of interest that may exist regarding any item on the agenda. A Steering Committee member's vote to award a project to the entity at which the member is employed, shall not constitute a de facto conflict of interest.

The **Thematic Window Operational Committees (TWOC)** on peace is a governance body set up at Window level that have delegated authority for operational decisions on the activities of the Fund, within the Fund Thematic Windows, and in line with the strategic guidance of the Fund Steering Committee. It also provides a platform for coordination between UN Agencies, donors, and (inter)national organizations within the respective Thematic Window, with the objective to facilitate a joint approach within the sector, coordinate the implementation of activities and avoid duplication of efforts.

The TWOC on peace are expected to meet at least quarterly and more frequently as required. are co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and a designated UN official / Head of Agency on rotational basis. The TWOC on Peace would comprise of:

- 3 representatives of Participating UN Organizations;
- Donors contributing to the Thematic Window;
- Representative(s) of other relevant entities (Civil Society, INGOs and private sector) as observers to provide technical capacity when required.

All the member's categories should be represented in the meeting. In addition, exceptional participants may be invited to attend when any matter requires clarification or external opinion. Such participants will not be involved in decision making.

In case the TWOC cannot physically/virtually meet, the decisions will be taken by virtual vote, through email, and the same norms will apply. The Secretariat will coordinate the communications with the TWOC members.

The TWOC will make decisions by consensus.

The Fund Secretariat and Administrative Agent participate as ex-officio members.

#### **Responsibilities**

For each Thematic Window, the Thematic Window Operational Committee is responsible for:

- a. Review and approve proposals submitted for funding to the TWOC, ensuring their conformity with the requirements of the Fund Terms of Reference (TOR) and the window Results Framework.
- b. Approve funds' allocations to approved projects within the window and based on agreed allocation criteria.
- c. Monitor and Review the status and implementation of the Fund projects within the Window and oversee progress against the results framework.
- d. Provide technical analysis and strategic advice to the SC and Fund partners on emerging issues and trends;
- e. Facilitate, coordinate and quality assure assessments, surveys and studies within the specific Thematic Windows in accordance with the directives of the SC.

- f. Any other activities assigned by the Fund Steering Committee.

#### Avoidance of Conflict of Interest

All members of the TWOC shall declare any conflict of interest that may exist regarding any item on the agenda. A TWOC member's vote to award a project to the entity at which the member is employed, shall not constitute a de facto conflict of interest.

Under the TWOC on Peace, **the JPP technical committees** have delegated authority for operational decisions on the activities of the JPP and in line with the strategic guidance of the Fund Steering Committee and TWOC.

The JPP will consist of two technical committees, as follows:

- (1) JPP Development Partners Group
- (2) JPP Deputies Group

The Technical Committees (TC) will be comprised of development partners and participating UN Agencies respectively, at the technical level.

The TCs will meet at least once a month a year and will focus on driving a results-oriented, coordinated approach to advancing priorities and commitments under the respective output areas.<sup>40</sup>

The Department of External Resources will be the primary point of state contact, while both central and local government entities will be briefed regularly, at the technical level.

The Technical Committees will provide a platform for coordination between UN Agencies and donors to the JPP.

In case the Technical Committees cannot physically/virtually meet, the decisions will be taken by virtual vote, through email, and the same norms will apply. The Secretariat will coordinate the communications with the members.

The Technical Committee will make decisions by consensus.

#### Avoidance of Conflict of Interest

All members of the Technical Committee shall declare any conflict of interest that may exist regarding any item on the agenda. A member's vote to award a project to the entity at which the member is employed, shall not constitute a de facto conflict of interest.

### **SECRETARIAT**

---


The JPP will be serviced by the secretariat for the SDG Fund. In this capacity, the Secretariat is responsible for the daily coordination of Fund activities and monitor compliance with the rules and procedures laid down in this Operations Manual (annex...). The Secretariat will provide support to the Steering Committee and the Technical Committees, for which it also serves as rapporteur. It also serves as the point of liaison with the Administrative Agent (the MPTF Office). The Secretariat is hosted by the RCO.

#### **Composition**

The Secretariat composition will depend on the needs and on availability of funding. The Secretariat's organigram and budget are submitted to the Steering Committee for approval on a yearly basis or whenever amendments are necessary.

The JPP structure is reflected below with following positions identified:

- SDG Fund Coordinator/Head of Secretariat (Co-Financed Position)<sup>41</sup>
- JPP Coordinator
- Communications/Reporting Specialist
- Field Coordinating Officer
- Data Analyst
- Programme Support Assistant



The secretariat will be required to:

Technical advice

- a. Advise the Steering Committee and Technical Committees on strategic priorities, as well as programmatic and financial allocations;
- b. Commission assessments, studies, surveys as instructed by the Steering Committee;
- c. Advise and support entities that submit concept notes and project proposals on programmatic and operational issues related to the Fund;
- d. Conduct knowledge management for the Fund, including codification of knowledge, generation of good practices and lessons learned and proposals for recommendations;
- e. Develop the Fund's communication strategy;
- f. Develop the Fund's resource mobilization strategy;
- g. Provide administrative support to the technical committees meetings;

Management of the Fund's operational activities

- a. Coordinate and manage all the daily activities necessary for the proper functioning of the Fund;
- b. Ensure compliance with the rules and procedures of the Fund;
- c. Organize the meetings of the Steering Committee and Technical Committees: prepare and circulate the meeting agenda, document the conclusions, decisions and follow up points and distribute the minutes to all Steering Committee or Technical Committee Members;
- d. Regularly circulate information on the activities of the Fund to all interested parties;
- e. Liaise with the Administrative Agent on fund administration issues, including issues related to project/ fund extensions and project/fund closure;

- f. Prepare and submit the Fund Transfer Request (FTR) to the Administrative Agent, according to the decisions made by the Steering Committee or the TWOC.

#### Planning, programming and monitoring and evaluation of the Fund portfolio

- a. Conduct the calls for proposals, ensuring wide dissemination to all eligible entities and organizing the project selection process;
- b. Conduct the administrative and technical review of the projects:
  - Administrative review: ensure that applicants have provided all necessary documentation in relation to the concept notes and project proposals submitted for funding;
  - Technical Review:
    - Ensure the technical quality of the projects: through a specialized technical review by Thematic Window;
    - Ensure the relevance of the intervention: ensures that projects submitted for approval by the SC are (i) aligned with the priorities of the Government and the TOR of the Fund; (ii) coordinated with existing and planned activities within the Thematic Window and (iii) developed in consultation with relevant national institutions.
- c. Monitor and support the implementation of the funded projects (details in section 7 below): assess projects' progress reported by the Participating UN Organizations, as well as identify issues, challenges and risks arising during implementation, and propose recommended actions and options for mitigating. Provide planning and M&E support when required.
- d. Facilitate collaboration and communication between the Fund partners when relevant to ensure programmes are implemented effectively and in close connection/complementarity;
- e. Develop the Fund Risk Management Strategy and ensure the risk monitoring and management;
- f. Liaise with the AA to update the funding framework of the Fund on a regular basis, informing the Steering Committee and the TWOC;
- g. Consolidate annual and final narrative reports provided by the Participating UN Organizations and submit them to the Steering Committee for approval;
- h. Carry out the process of the independent evaluations of the Fund.

#### **Secretariat Costs**

The operating costs of the Secretariat will be charged to the Fund as direct costs. A workplan with a budget will be annually submitted to the Steering Committee for approval and whenever substantive revisions of the budget are needed. The operating costs may cover both salaries of the Secretariat staff and other costs directly related to the functions of the Secretariat (travel costs for field missions, monitoring, etc.). If necessary, the Steering Committee may assign additional specific functions to the Secretariat. Such decision shall be duly documented.

The Secretariat will work in close partnership with UN resident and non-resident agencies and departments including DPPA, PBSO, OHCHR, IOM, UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UN-Women, ILO, UNFPA to ensure coherent and streamlined support from the UN system.

#### **RESULTS, MONITORING and EVALUATION**

Monitoring and reporting under the JPP will be based on a results framework and reporting timeline that is shared amongst partners. This will serve to minimize administrative costs otherwise associated with having to meet the varied reporting requirements of different development

partners and, will allow for more monitoring related funds to be directed towards ongoing and innovative data collection methods. The quality of programme M&E will require additional coordination resources.

### **Monitoring**

Monitoring will be on the basis of quarterly updates, based on information from participating agencies, collated and assured by the programme secretariat.

A first draft of the results framework for each output is included in the Annex. For each level of results from Goal to Output there are indicators, baselines, targets and means of verification included. They will be finalized during the first meetings of the Technical Committees.

### **Reporting**

The JPP will follow MPTFO guidelines pertaining to reporting. Participating UN agencies will submit activities, milestones, results achieved and other relevant information, as outlined in the annual workplan to the RCO, for purposes of annual reporting. The RCO will liaise with the MPTFO in submitting consolidated reports, and ensure timely circulation to relevant stakeholders, via the MPTFO. Participating agencies are expected to submit annual financials via their respective agency headquarters to the MPTFO by means of UNEX.

#### Narrative Reporting:

The Participating UN Organizations will provide annual narrative reports and the final narrative report to the Secretariat by 3<sup>rd</sup> of March. The Secretariat will consolidate these reports and submit to the AA. In addition, Participating UN Organisations will submit quarterly updates to the Secretariat which will be shared with partners through the Steering Committee.

#### Financial Reporting:

Each Participating UN Organization will provide the Administrative Agent with the following financial statements and reports:

(a) Annual financial report as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the Programme Account, to be provided no later than four (4) months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year; and

(b) Certified final financial statements and final financial reports after the completion of the activities in the Joint Programme Document, including the final year of the activities in the Joint Programme Document, to be provided no later than five (5) months (31 May) after the end of the calendar year in which the financial closure of the activities in the Joint Programme Document occurs, or according to the time period specified in the financial regulations and rules of the Participating UN Organization, whichever is earlier. The Administrative Agent will ensure the preparation of consolidated narrative progress and financial reports, based on the reports provided by the PUNOs and the JPP Secretariat, and will provide these consolidated reports to each development partner that has contributed to the Programme, as well as the Steering Committee by 31<sup>st</sup> May.

### **Evaluation**

There will be an independent final evaluation during the last three months of the programme.

The UN will make every effort to incorporate specific development partner reporting requirements into the JPP reports. These should be discussed and agreed upon in consultation with the RCO and UNDP at the point of determining the Individual Funding Agreement.

## **FUND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS**

---

The Fund Administration function is performed by the trustee - the Administrative Agent (AA).

The MPTF Office has been appointed as the AA of the Fund and will use the pass-through modality. The AA services include:

- The establishment of the Fund: support for the design of the Fund (TOR and OM), and development of legal instruments; and
- Administration of the Fund: receipt, administration, and disbursement of funds to implementing entities in accordance with the decisions of the SC, and consolidation of financial reports.

Detailed responsibilities of the AA are listed in the operational manual of the Fund.

The Participating UN Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial responsibility and accountability for the funds disbursed by the AA<sup>42</sup>. Each UN organization is entitled to deduct 7 percent indirect costs of the total allocation received<sup>43</sup>. The MPTF Office will charge an administrative agent fee of one per cent (1%) of the total contributions made to the Joint Programme.

### **CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS**

---

The AA will then enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with each of the PUNOs (implementing UN agencies), who will work directly or in partnership with Government and non-government stakeholders (i.e. including academic institutions, consultants etc).

The AA will also sign a Standard Administrative Arrangement (SAA) with each development partner contributing to the Joint Programme.

### **FUNDING ALLOCATIONS**

---

Expected and committed funding contributions:

Australia: USD 1.3 Mn for dealing with the past, social cohesion (2019-2022)

Canada: USD 1.3 Mn for social cohesion, dealing with the past and returns/resettlement

United Kingdom: up to USD 4.2 mn for dealing with the past and returns/resettlement (2019-2022)

United States: USD 1.16 mn.

### **Terms of Reference for the JPP Technical Committee**

Reflected in the narrative of the project document

### **Terms of Reference for a Secretariat as Convenor of the JPP**

Reflected in the narrative of the project document

### **Terms of Reference for the Technical Committee members of the JPP Outputs**

The Technical Committee members will be responsible for providing technical leadership on programmatic issues under the JPP. They will be required to work closely with the Secretariat (as Convenor) and to undertake the functions below:

- Provide substantive guidance to the planning and programming of interventions under the output.
- Flag emerging issues, risks and opportunities for attention by the Technical Committee.
- Advice on opportunities to further promote key cross-cutting issues, i.e. gender, conflict sensitivity and human rights.
- Take the lead on drafting substantive sections of the JPP output reports, including the update on overall context, activities (of the lead agency), and section on risks and issues.
- Ensure the incorporation of Technical Committee deliberations into output-level workplans in close coordination with the Secretariat
- Ensure timely delivery of inputs to all JPP results monitoring and reporting processes.

### **Terms of Reference for UNDP MPTF Office (As AA)**

**ANNEX B: REPORTING SCHEDULE**

<b>JPP Start Date:</b>	2 April 2019			<b>Notes</b>
<b>JPP End Date:</b>	1 April 2022			By this date all funds are to be committed in agency systems completely.
<b>Type of Report(s)</b>	<b>Period(s) covered</b>	<b>Due at RCO</b>	<b>Due at MPTFO/UNEX</b>	
Quarterly Updates	Q3 2020	1 <sup>st</sup> November 2020	-	-
	Q4 2020	1 <sup>st</sup> December 2020	-	
	Q2 2021	1 <sup>st</sup> June 2021	-	
	Q3 2021	1 <sup>st</sup> September 2021	-	
	Q4 2021	1 <sup>st</sup> December 2021	-	
Narrative (Annual)	2 Apr- 31 Dec 2019	3 <sup>rd</sup> March 2020	31 <sup>st</sup> March 2020	Please include the activities, milestones, results achieved during the first quarter (Jan-March)
	1 Jan – 31 Dec 2020	3 <sup>rd</sup> of March 2021	31 <sup>st</sup> March 2021	Please include the activities, milestones, results achieved during the first quarter (Jan-March)
	1 Jan – 31 Dec 2021	21 <sup>st</sup> February 2022	31 <sup>st</sup> March 2020	Please include the activities, milestones, results achieved during the first quarter (Jan-March)
Financial (Annual)	Same periods as above	N/A	30 <sup>th</sup> April 2020 (via UNEX)	Please note that financials are to be submitted via agency HQ to MPTFO via UNEX.
			30 <sup>th</sup> April 2021 (via UNEX)	
			30 <sup>th</sup> April 2022 (via UNEX)	
Narrative (Programme End)	2 Apr 2019 – 1 Apr 2022	1 Aug 2022	23 <sup>rd</sup> April 2023 after the operational closure of the JPP.	-
Certified Financial Report	2 April 2019 – 1 April 2022	N/A	Before 31 May 2023	Please note that the certified financials are to be submitted via agency



				HQ to MPTFO via UNEX following internal guidelines/ deadlines after the operational closure of the JPP.
--	--	--	--	---

<sup>1</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “*Vistas for Prosperity and Splendor*,” speech at swearing-in ceremony as President of Sri Lanka at Ruwanweliseya, Anuradhapura, 17 November 2019.

<sup>2</sup> “Update: Sri Lanka Government to Withdraw from Co-Sponsoring HRC Resolution 30/1,” *NewsFirst*, 19 February 2020, available at <https://www.newsfirst.lk/2020/02/19/sri-lanka-government-to-withdraw-from-co-sponsoring-unhrc-resolution-30-1/>; Zulfik Farzan, “GoSL Officially Withdraws from UNHRC Resolutionsn 30/1 and 40/1,” *NewsFirst*, 26 February 2020, available at <https://www.newsfirst.lk/2020/02/26/gosl-officially-withdraws-from-unhrc-resolutions-30-1-40-1/>

<sup>3</sup> “Security Council Open Debate on ‘Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations’ – Statement by H.E. Mrs. Kshenuka Senewiratne, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN,” 13 February 2020, available at: <https://www.un.int/srilanka/news/security-council-open-debate-%E2%80%98peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace-transitional-justice-conflict>

<sup>4</sup> “*Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour*,” 2019, p.6.

<sup>5</sup> Alexandra Ulmer and Omar Rajaratnam, “Unsubstantiated Claims Muslim Doctor Sterilised Women Raise Tensions in Sri Lanka,” *Reuters*, 6 June 2019, Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-doctor-insight-idUSKCN1T71HS>

<sup>6</sup> <https://news.sky.com/story/sri-lanka-attacks-youtube-defends-hosting-videos-featuring-hate-preacher-zahran-hashim-11702203>

<sup>7</sup> Data values obtained by UNDP Crisis Dashboard

<sup>8</sup> See Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence”, *Journal of Peace Research*, (vol. 27, no. 2, August 1990), pp.291-305.

<sup>9</sup> “UN Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech,” May 2019, available at <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/UN%20Strategy%20and%20Plan%20of%20Action%20on%20Hate%20Speech%2018%20June%20SYNOPSIS.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> UNEP. Climate Change and Security. Available at

[https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/ClimateChange\\_Security\\_Poster.pdf](https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/ClimateChange_Security_Poster.pdf) UNEP identifies seven ways in which climate adds to risks: Local resource competition; livelihood insecurity and migration; extreme weather and disasters; volatile food prices; water management; sea-level rise; and unintended effects of climate policies.

<sup>11</sup> Madhavi Malalgoda Ariyabandu and Dilrukshi Fonseka. (2009) Do Disasters Discriminate? A Human Security Analysis of the Impact of the Tsunami in India, Sri Lanka and of the Kashmir Earthquake in Pakistan. Resilience in communities depends on many factors including wealth, social connections, access to power and the media, government policies and social and gender equality within communities.

<sup>12</sup> M Sutton and S. DeSilva-Ranasinghe. (2016). Transnational Crime in Sri Lanka. Future Considerations for International Cooperation. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 1 October 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with UNODC official, December 2020; Myanmar’s Shan State is the largest producer of *yaba*. Large quantities are regularly smuggled from Myanmar to Bangladesh’s eastern coastal town of Cox’s Bazar. It is possible that *yaba* is also smuggled into Sri Lanka, including possibly via India. With strong control over supply and therefore pricing, there are risks that *yaba* could flood the Sri Lankan market, replacing heroin, as cartels smuggle stocks across the Bay of Bengal to Sri Lanka, and onwards. “Drugs in South Asia: The Rise of Meth?” *South Asia Geopolitics Bulletin*, No. 7, (DPPA-DPO South Asia), 13 April 2020.

<sup>14</sup> Interviews, UNODC officials, December 2020; “Drugs in South Asia: The Rise of Meth?” *South Asia Geopolitics Bulletin*, No. 7, (DPPA-DPO South Asia), 13 April 2020.

<sup>15</sup> M Sutton and S. DeSilva-Ranasinghe. (2016). Transnational Crime in Sri Lanka. Future Considerations for International Cooperation. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 1 October 2016.

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Sustainable Development Framework 2018-2022 (Sri Lanka), p.19, available at [https://lk.one.un.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Final\\_UNSDF\\_2018-2022.pdf](https://lk.one.un.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Final_UNSDF_2018-2022.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> *Sri Lankan Army (11 January 2019) and IOM*

<sup>18</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “*Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour*,” 2019, p. 78.

---

<sup>19</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 77. The President has also recognized housing as a basic need. See President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 19.

<sup>20</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 78.

<sup>22</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 78.

<sup>23</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019.

<sup>24</sup> Walter Källin, “Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons: An Essential Dimension of Peacebuilding,” *Brookings Institution*, 13 March 2008, available at <https://www.brookings.edu/research/durable-solutions-for-internally-displaced-persons-an-essential-dimension-of-peacebuilding/>

<sup>25</sup> The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) appointed by former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, in its final report in November 2011, took cognizance of the request of religious leaders for a mechanism for “a spiritual form of accountability that will strengthen or build trust in people” (8.272 of the LLRC final report) and the right of the families of the disappeared “to know the truth about what happened to such persons, and to bring the matter to closure.” (5.37 of the LLRC report, November 2011).

<sup>26</sup> “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” p.77.

<sup>27</sup> “Security Council Open Debate on ‘Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace: Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations’ – Statement by H.E. Mrs. Kshenuka Senewiratne, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN,” 13 February 2020, available at: [www.un.int/srilanka/news/security-council-open-debate-%E2%80%98peacebuilding,-and-sustaining-peace-transitional-justice-conflict](http://www.un.int/srilanka/news/security-council-open-debate-%E2%80%98peacebuilding,-and-sustaining-peace-transitional-justice-conflict)

<sup>28</sup> This is consistent with the UN Youth Strategy that advocates reinforcing the capacity of youth-led organisations involved in peace and security, to increase the impact of their work and their organizational sustainability, as well as to reinforce the capacity of institutional actors to work with youth people. “Youth 2030: Working with and for Young People: United Nations Youth Strategy,” United Nations, 201p. 13, available at [https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/18-00080\\_UN-Youth-Strategy\\_Web.pdf](https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/18-00080_UN-Youth-Strategy_Web.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> The distinction between the terms *return* and *resettlement* is made, where the term *return* is used to refer to people who go back to their original places of habitation, while the term *resettlement* is used to refer to those who relocate to places other than their original places of habitation. This distinction is based on the report of the Representative of the Secretary General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, (11 August 2010, A/65/282) and the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” (11 February 1998, submitted pursuant to the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/39, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2).

<sup>30</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 78.

<sup>31</sup> SDG 3; President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidential election manifesto, subsequently tabled in Parliament on 03 January 2020 and adopted as the official Statement of Government Policy, states that “one selected hospital in every district will be fully equipped and upgraded to a level similar to that of the National Hospital at present.” See President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “*Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour*,” 2019, p.23.

<sup>32</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 78.

<sup>33</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 77. The President has also recognized housing as a basic need. See President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 19.

<sup>34</sup> Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.

<sup>35</sup> SDG 3; President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidential election manifesto, subsequently tabled in Parliament on 03 January 2020 and adopted as the official Statement of Government Policy, states that “one selected hospital in every district will be fully equipped and upgraded to a level similar to that of the National Hospital at present.” See President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “*Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour*,” 2019, p.23.

<sup>36</sup> President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” 2019, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> This will include divisional-level administrative and legislative Government bodies, GNs, divisional secretariats and other state service providers such as agriculture and veterinary extension officers, social service and probation officers, police, police women desk officers, medical officers, midwives, public health inspectors and Samurdhi officials.

<sup>38</sup> The President’s manifesto, subsequently tabled in Parliament as government policy, states “all private land currently being held by the government will be released to their respective owners.” See *Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour*, p. 78.

<sup>39</sup> “Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour,” p. 7; Speech by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on being sworn in as President, at Ruwanweliseya, Anuradhapura on 18 November 2019.

<sup>40</sup> The ToR for the Technical Committees is provided in Annexure A of this document.

<sup>41</sup> This is currently financed by the JPP (Peace Window of the One SDG Fund), but contribution towards this position will also come from the resilience and data windows of the SDG Fund, once operationalized.

<sup>42</sup> UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programmes, p.14

<sup>43</sup> UNDG Guidance Note on Joint Programmes p.16